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Against the Grain: Therapeutic Judging
in a Traditional Family Court
Vicki Lens
The last several decades have seen a proliferation of specialized courts, including
within the family court system, that deviate from the adversarial model, and that rely on
therapeutic jurisprudence and other problem-solving techniques. Whether and how
traditional family courts can incorporate the best practices of these specialized courts is a
largely understudied area. Drawing from ethnographic observations of a traditional
urban family court, this study finds that some judges are able to transform
nontherapeutic courtrooms into therapeutic ones despite obstacles. These “against the
grain” actors, who act contrary to the institution’s dominant norms and practices,
demonstrate how therapeutic jurisprudence and other problem-solving techniques can be
utilized in traditional courtrooms.
INTRODUCTION
The adversarial system is often unsuited for unraveling and remedying societal
ills that spill into the courtroom, especially when rehabilitation rather than punish-
ment is the goal. The result has been a proliferation of specialized courts, including
family treatment courts (FTCs), drug courts, and mental health courts, that deviate
from the adversarial model and use a problem-solving approach, often relying on
therapeutic jurisprudence techniques. The abundance of research on such courts has
demonstrated their effectiveness (see, e.g., Aos, Miller, and Drake 2006; Latimer,
Morton-Bourgon, and Chretien 2006; Green et al. 2007; Worcel et al. 2008;
Downey and Roman 2010; Castellano 2011; Rossman et al. 2011; Bruns et al.
2012). Specialized courts, however, are unlikely to replace traditional courts, which
still handle the vast majority of cases involving such social problems as child mal-
treatment, drug abuse, or mental illness. Whether and how traditional courts can
incorporate the best practices of problem-solving courts is a largely understudied
area. This ethnographic study of an overburdened and underresourced traditional
urban family court examines the ways in which some judges incorporate a more
therapeutic approach.
First, the literature on problem-solving courts is reviewed, including how they
differ from traditional courts, what methods and practices they use, and what con-
stitutes best practices. The pivotal role of the judge is also examined. Drawing from
ethnographic data, the ways in which some judges transform a nontherapeutic
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courtroom into a therapeutic one is explored. Theoretical and practical implications
are then discussed.
PROBLEM-CENTERED COURTS AND THE THERAPEUTIC
APPROACH
Problems such as substance abuse, child maltreatment, and criminality con-
nected to mental illness require a court to do more than decide a dispute or assign
guilt. Often, they require behavioral interventions, especially if recidivism is to be
avoided or families repaired. In recognition of this, specialized courts were created
with a very different mission and approach than traditional courts. The first such
specialized court was the family court, established in the early part of the twentieth
century, first to adjudicate juvenile delinquency cases, and then in the 1960s
expanded to cover other family issues, including private matters involving divorce
and custody and public matters regarding child maltreatment (Babb 1998). Envi-
sioned as a hybrid of the legal and social, it incorporates aspects of the adversarial
system, including its focus on due process, while also emphasizing collaboration
over conflict, and rehabilitation over punishment.
More recently, specialized courts have proliferated in other areas where social
and behavioral issues are intertwined with legal transgressions. Among the most
common specialized courts are drug treatment courts, where drug offenders receive
rehabilitative services as an alternative to prison, and mental health courts, where
people whose mental illness manifests in criminal acts, usually misdemeanors, are
treated for their illness in lieu of punishment. Significantly, this judicial trend has
also infiltrated family courts, including FTCs, where substance-abusing parents who
have abused or neglected their children receive intensive treatment and
monitoring.
The creation of FTCs within an already specialized venue suggests the unful-
filled promise of family courts. Virtually since their inception, family courts have
been widely criticized on several measures, including court inefficiencies and delays,
judges insufficiently attuned to the social and psychology complexity of family
strife, and failing to ensure essential services and treatment (Kahn 1953; Babb
1998, 2014; Spinak 2002). As one commentator succinctly noted: “As a problem
solving court, Family Court has been remarkably unsuccessful” (Spinak 2008, 260).
Traditional family courts thus have much to learn from the latest iteration of
problem-solving courts.
The Characteristics of Problem-Solving Courts
Outwardly, specialized problem-solving courts and traditional courts look the
same; both take place in a courtroom with the usual actors—judges, lawyers, and
respondents. However, the dialogue and dynamics are very different. In problem-
solving courts, providing treatment and services, not adjudicating guilt, are the
main focus. Collaboration, rather than conflict, is stressed (Winick 2002–2003;
Fay-Ramirez 2015). Teamwork is emphasized over winning legal arguments, and
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social services workers are more likely to participate as “treatment experts” rather
than as legal witnesses (Castellano 2011, 487). Sanctions are available, but used
sparingly, at least initially, as an educational and reflective tool rather than a puni-
tive one. More common are rewards for good behavior rather than sanctions for
bad behavior (Fay-Ramirez 2015).
While the first problem-solving courts, drug courts, were initially envisioned as
a solution to case overload in traditional criminal courts, over time they shifted to
a more therapeutic approach (McCoy 2003; Spinak 2008), and while not all
problem-solving courts are guided by the philosophy of therapeutic jurisprudence
(TJ), this approach exemplifies some of these courts’ best practices, notably in the
mental health courts. TJ views legal rules and procedures and legal actors as thera-
peutic or antitherapeutic agents that affect participants’ psychological well-being.
The tools of TJ are especially suited to problem-solving courts because they draw
from the psychological and behavioral sciences for motivating positive behaviors.
They include such practices as creating a respectful, empathetic, nonpaternalistic,
and supportive environment where participants are actively engaged in the
decision-making process and are persuaded rather than coerced into making behav-
ioral changes (Winick 2002–2003). As a court-based “public health approach to
social and behavioral problems,” TJ is a natural, if not always utilized, fit with
problem-solving courts (Winick 2002–2003, 1061).
While less adversarial than traditional courts, problem-solving courts are still
cognizant of due process (Wexler 1993). Like TJ, procedural due process emphasizes
how courts treat people, and hence provides another model for positive courtroom
behavior. It focuses on four elements: voice, neutrality, respectful treatment, and
trustworthiness (Tyler 2006). Voice means the opportunity to tell one’s story, to
contribute actively to, and shape, the narrative of events. Neutrality requires an
unbiased decision maker who is transparent about how decisions are made. Respect
means dignified and courteous treatment. Trustworthiness requires expressions of
benevolence, sincerity, and concern. Thus, like TJ, protecting the dignity of persons
is a core value and a guiding principle (Perlin 2013).
Both TJ and an enhanced focus on procedural due process are considered to
have positive behavioral affects. A respectful, inclusive environment engenders trust
in legal authorities, and hence is more likely to lead to compliance with court
orders (Tyler 2006). Similarly, TJ, with its emphasis on support, empathy, and
respect, encourages constructive and beneficial courtroom interactions (Winick
2002–2003). Thus problem-solving courts often combine aspects of both (Poythress
et al. 2002; Perlin 2013).
As in traditional courts, problem-solving judges play a pivotal role as the chor-
eographers of the proceedings. However, they are expected to read from a different
script than traditional judges, and one more aligned with TJ than the adversarial
system. While traditional judges strike a passive, neutral pose, the ideal problem-
solving judge is active and engaged, displaying compassion and empathy (Nolan
2002). They are more likely than traditional judges to speak directly to respondents
rather than their attorneys. They also hit a different note, talking in conversational,
rather than legal, tones (Fay-Ramirez 2015). Discussions of social and behavioral
issues are de rigueur, while legal talk is held to a minimum.
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The Effectiveness of Problem-Solving Courts
The effectiveness of problem-solving courts has been well studied, especially the
first such courts, the drug courts. Overall, the results are positive, with participants
having lower rates of recidivism than offenders who did not participate in drug courts
(Aos, Miller, and Drake 2006; Latimer, Morton-Bourgon, and Chretien 2006; Downey
and Roman 2010; Rossman et al. 2011). Reduced drug use and other psychosocial ben-
efits have also been reported (Rossman et al. 2011). Mental health courts have also
shown positive results, with some studies showing a drop in both recidivism and psy-
chiatric hospitalizations and other psychosocial benefits (O’Keefe 2006; for a summary
of recent findings, see Cummings 2010, 299–300). FTCs have been less studied, but
the evidence to date also suggests positive outcomes. Specifically, several studies have
shown that FTCs resulted in shorter foster-care placements and a greater likelihood
that children would be returned to their parents than children in traditional courts
(Green et al. 2007; Worcel et al. 2008; Bruns et al. 2012).
One important exception is a study conducted on an FTC located in the same
court system, the New York City Family Court, as the instant study. Picard-Fritsche
et al. (2011) found children took longer to have their cases resolved, and were sig-
nificantly less likely to be reunified with their families, than in the traditional fam-
ily court. Their study, however, identified an important variable in the success or
failure of specialized courts, and courts overall—the judge. Because the FTC judges
in their study also handled similar cases in the traditional family court, they were
able to tease out the “judge effect.” They found that “the presiding judge in the
case has more influence over respondent perceptions [of their court experience]
than whether or not they enrolled in the FTC” (Picard-Fritsche et al. 2011, vi).
The judge effect is a well-known and well-documented phenomenon. While
many variables affect respondents’ experiences in court and case outcomes, there is
no doubt that judges play a starring role. Draped in black robes and physically ele-
vated over other court actors, their authority, moral and otherwise, is readily
observable. What they say and do can influence a respondent’s behavior.
Studies of other problem-solving courts confirm that judges are one of the
most significant variables in the success or failure of such courts. In one of the larg-
est studies of drug courts to date, the judge was the single biggest influence on the
outcome, with judicial praise, support, and other positive attributes translating into
fewer crimes and less use of drugs by participants (Rossman et al. 2011). Similarly,
in a study of a drug court that measured behavioral changes through drug-test
results, positive supportive comments by the judge were correlated with fewer failed
drug tests, while negative comments led to the opposite, and neutral comments had
no effect (Senjo and Leip 2001). A qualitative study based on interviews with drug
court respondents revealed the dynamics at work, with respondents reporting that
the ritual of appearing before a judge and receiving support and accolades, and
“tough love” when warranted and reasonable, helped them stick with court-ordered
treatment (Farole and Cissner 2005; see also Satel 1998).
Consequently, even a well-resourced problem-solving court may not work if
the judge fails to adopt TJ and other problem-solving strategies effectively. As Maze
and Hannah (2008) found in their qualitative study of a therapeutic juvenile
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dependency court for domestic violence survivors, maintaining a therapeutic
approach is challenging for even the most well-intentioned judges. As they
reported, “most clients interviewed described feeling they were demeaned and
treated unfairly by the same dependency judges who expressed a strong desire to
empower and support” (Maze and Hannah 2008, 42). Most of the women inter-
viewed reported negative experiences, claiming that the judge did not “listen to
their side of the story,” that they were not treated with respect, and “were spoken
to harshly and treated like children” (Maze and Hannah 2008, 37).
A TJ approach may also erode over time, as Fay-Ramirez found in her ethno-
graphic study of an FTC. Over the year and a half in which the study was con-
ducted, “therapeutic norms disintegrate[d] and more non-therapeutic norms and
practices t[ook] place” (Fay-Ramirez 2015, 17). Judges who had previously relied on
therapeutic options became more punitive. Underlying the shift were the same
obstacles that confront traditional family courts, including high caseloads, an inabil-
ity to offer individualized and flexible rehabilitation services, and staff turnover.
Criticisms of Problem-Solving Courts
Problem-solving courts are not without controversy. As Nolan (2003) observes,
therapeutic justice may crowd out other forms of justice, including due process and
the protection of individual rights. Because respondents’ behaviors are closely moni-
tored, problem-solving courts may paradoxically invite more coercive, intrusive, and
punitive approaches, repackaged in the guise of a therapeutic intervention (Boldt
1998; Nolan 2003; Tiger 2013) Spinak (2010) echoes this concern regarding FTCs,
where the enhanced surveillance of respondents’ behaviors can both stigmatize and
disempower them, especially families of color, who are disproportionally represented
in the child welfare system. The emphasis on individual accountability also obscures
structural and systemic inequities that deprive poor families of crucial resources,
while also impeding community-based responses. Finally, Spinak notes that
enhanced court intervention also gives more power to judges, who may not have
the skills, training, or temperament to exercise it positively.
Nonetheless, problem-solving courts, and TJ in particular, are significant and
promising reforms that Perlin (2013, 23) describes as “the best tool available to us
to infuse the legal process with needed dignity.” While not without flaws, both in
theory and practice, such courts offer a viable alternative to the oft-criticized tradi-
tional court system, especially when it comes to social and psychological issues.
Such courts can also function as “laboratories,” with best practices diffused into the
traditional court system (Rottman 2000, 26).
Little is known, however, about the use of such practices in traditional courts.
This gap is significant for several reasons. First, despite the proliferation of special-
ized courts, traditional courts are more common. Understanding whether and how
TJ and other problem-solving techniques can be harmonized within traditional
courts is thus essential. Second, as noted above, specialized courts are not immune,
especially over time, from the institutional problems that plague more traditional
courts (Fay-Ramirez 2015). Thus, specialized courts can benefit from knowing how
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judges in traditional courts overcome these obstacles. Third, along with TJ and
problem-solving techniques, specialized courts typically incorporate enhanced serv-
ices, additional personnel, and other supports. In contrast, in traditional courts such
enhancements are lacking, thus highlighting how much—or how little—a judge
can do without them.
Drawing from ethnographic observations, this study explores whether and how
judges in a traditional family court employ more collaborative problem-solving techni-
ques, including TJ. The study’s findings—that some judges are able to transform non-
therapeutic courtrooms into therapeutic ones despite many obstacles—have both
practical and theoretical implications. Practically, they suggest ways in which TJ and
other problem-solving techniques can be infused and sustained, despite institutional
obstacles, with judges being the key to such efforts. Theoretically, they add to our
understanding of variations among institutional actors, including “against the grain”
actors who act contrary to an institution’s dominant norms and practices.
METHODOLOGY
The study draws on data from a family court located in a borough of New
York City. The data are the result of a focused ethnography, a type of sociological
ethnography that examines specific and well-defined interactions, acts, or social sit-
uations in the field rather than an entire system or culture (Knoblauch 2005).
Focused ethnography is characterized by relatively short-term field visits and inten-
sive data collection to observe specific structured events or activities. It is especially
suited to the observation of courtroom interactions, which are a form of structured
social interaction bounded in space and time, with a well-defined beginning and
end and cast of characters.
The borough where the study was conducted has the largest percentage of chil-
dren living in poverty—over 40 percent—in the city, and handles more than 3,000
cases of child abuse and neglect annually (New York City Family Court 2010).
Ninety-four child welfare and abuse proceedings were observed over a one-year
period between 2012 and 2013, with forty-six observations conducted by the author,
and forty-eight conducted by a research assistant. During the period of the observa-
tions, nine judges were assigned to the family court. Eight of the nine judges were
observed multiple times over multiple observation days and, with one exception,
were observed by both the research assistant and the author, at different times. The
use of two researchers observing the same site allowed observations to be cross-
checked, thus increasing the trustworthiness of the data (Erlandson et al. 1993).
The research was approved by an institutional review board.
Judges were assigned cases randomly, and cases were not distinguished by level
of severity. Thus, each judge’s caseload was similar to every other judge’s. Seven
judges were female, of whom one was African American. The one male judge
observed was Latino. The length of service on the bench ranged from one year to
sixteen years, with an average length of service of seven years.
Initially, all types of proceedings involving child abuse and neglect were
observed, including initial intakes, emergency removal hearings, fact-finding
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hearings, where charges of abuse or neglect are adjudicated, and dispositional or
permanency planning hearings, where decisions are made as to where the child will
live. Initial observations revealed a distinction between formal court processes, such
as the taking of testimony, and less formal ones, where after a charge of maltreat-
ment was adjudicated or admitted, court actors discussed the family’s progress and
service needs. This study focused on the latter because they were more likely to
involve rehabilitative efforts than adjudication.
During the hearings, a detailed log was maintained, recording both what was said
(as much as could be captured) and other observations. These other observations
include physical descriptions of the parties and the environment of the room; obvious
states of emotion (e.g., anger, crying, laughter); the parties’ demeanor, tone, and style
(e.g., authoritarian, conciliatory, antagonistic); and quality of personal interactions
(e.g., friendly, hostile, apathetic). Routine and standardized data for each hearing
observation were also recorded. These include the parties present, the issue that
prompted the hearing, and the length of the hearing. Field jottings and observations
were transferred into full field notes immediately after actual observations. In-process
memos were used to “identify and develop analytic themes” (Emerson, Fretz, and
Shaw 1995, 100).
The first set of findings from this study focused on two core aspects of court
interaction: participation and compliance. It asked how judges encouraged or inhib-
ited a parent’s participation and what strategies and tactics they used to secure a
parent’s compliance with court orders. The initial data were analyzed using the-
matic analysis, which has been defined as a “method for identifying, analyzing and
reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun and Clark 2006, 79; Guest,
MacQueen, and Namey 2012). This analysis revealed two very divergent
approaches, with some judges discouraging participation and using harsh methods to
secure compliance, and other judges using a softer, more therapeutic and collabora-
tive approach (Lens forthcoming). This analysis builds on the latter finding, and
seeks to understand, in greater depth and detail, the strategies, rhetorical and other-
wise, that such judges used to inject therapeutic techniques into a traditional
courtroom.
For this analysis, the previously coded excerpts that indicated a more therapeu-
tic approach were identified and grouped together. The unit of analysis was each
interaction between judges and individual parents. Examples of codes that indicated
a therapeutic approach included “social lubricants,” when a judge greeted the parent
by name, “decision-making dialogues,” where parents were included in discussions
about how to help the family, and “support and praise,” when a judge praised or
complimented a parent. These coded excerpts were reanalyzed, along with the origi-
nal field notes in which they appeared, to further delineate the properties and
dimensions of therapeutic judging as practiced by the judges. The codes and themes
were also compared to the literature on therapeutic jurisprudence techniques. For
example, that literature describes how judges use “a more conversational and active
role when interacting with courtroom clients” (Fay-Ramirez 2015, 210), a technique
reflected, and further refined, in the reanalyzed coded excerpts.
Data sessions were also conducted between the author and a research assistant,
who, as noted above, had also conducted observations. The purpose of these
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meetings was to compare analysis and interpretation of the data, and to reach con-
sensus on the defining themes and their properties and dimensions.
FINDINGS
Courtroom interactions are ritualized and skilled conversations structured by
legal, institutional, and social rules. Legally, the rules of the adversarial process dic-
tate who has the authority to direct the conversation (the judge) and who can
speak for others (attorneys speak for their clients). This means that in family court,
where parents are represented by an attorney, legal talk often substitutes an attor-
ney’s voice for the parent’s.
Courtrooms are also social institutions with specific goals. In family court, the
goal is to “fix” families and protect children, either by removing children from the
home or ordering rehabilitative and other services. Conversations are constrained
by these institutional goals (Heritage 1997). Thus, overlaid over legal talk is institu-
tional talk, including bureaucratic buzz words, such as “permanency planning” and
other sometimes indecipherable references to the legal stages of the proceedings. As
the only noninstitutional player, the parent is an outsider and is expected to defer
to the institutional players’ knowledge and expertise. Such deference has a coercive
tinge; noncooperation can result in a loss of parental rights.
Courtrooms are also a form of public social ritual, and as such a performance
(Goffman 1972). As Goffman explains, a main goal of public performances is to
avoid social judgments that elicit embarrassment or shame. This has special salience
for parents in child maltreatment proceedings, who already come from highly stig-
matized groups (people of color, the poor), and who are accused of harming their
children, one of the most stigmatizing of acts. As Jennifer Reich (2005) docu-
mented in her study of the family court system, child maltreatment cases are often
rituals of social control, stigma, and stereotyping.
In more therapeutic courts, these legal, institutional, and social rules can be
bent. Judges and respondents are encouraged to talk directly with one another in
more conversational tones. While the institutional actors’ power over respondents
remains the same, it is channeled more constructively toward individualized help
and support. Similarly, while the stain of stigma cannot be erased, efforts are made
to lessen its sting.
In traditional courts these obstacles remain. It is thus not surprising, as the first
set of findings found, that many of the judges acted in nontherapeutic ways (Lens
forthcoming). Although as described above, family courts were envisioned as both
adjudicative and rehabilitative forums, judges often did not employ specialized
problem-solving or therapeutic techniques. They spoke about, and not to, parents,
and at times silenced parents who wished to speak. When stressing compliance
with court orders and treatment plans, they lectured, admonished, and even yelled
at parents. Overall, they treated parents, usually mothers, punitively and paternalis-
tically. This attitude sometimes extended to other court actors, including social
workers and attorneys, who were publicly admonished for perceived professional
failings. In short, they demonstrated many of the characteristics associated with
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overburdened, underresourced courts where judges have little time, and hence often
little patience, for adopting a more measured, collaborative, and problem-solving
approach.
However, some judges were more apt than others to infuse their courtrooms
with therapeutic moments. This softer, gentler, and more respectful approach
existed on a continuum, with one judge using therapeutic techniques virtually all of
the time, in stark contrast to the approach described above, and several others
judges incorporating such techniques to varying degrees, while overall avoiding a
harsher and more paternalistic tone.
Differences in judicial styles are not unexpected. As studies of judicial behavior
note, judges differ in their approach, including their personal style and how they
communicate (Conley and O’Barr 1990; Mack and Anleu 2010). It is also not sur-
prising, given family court’s rehabilitative mission, that some judges acted therapeu-
tically. These judges’ techniques demonstrate how traditional family courts can
function as they were originally envisioned. How, seemingly against the odds, these
judges spun moments of calm out of chaos, and created a supportive less stigmatiz-
ing environment is described next.
Micro Behaviors/Macro Consequences
In seemingly small ways but with large social payoffs, judges with a therapeutic
bent created more inclusive and respectful environments. They were more attuned
than nontherapeutic judges to positive social rituals. In less therapeutic courtrooms,
signals were sent suggesting that parents were interlopers. As one example, while
attorneys were addressed by their formal names with the appellation “Mr.” or “Ms.,”
parents were not. When addressed directly by the judge, they were often called
“Ma’am,” and when spoken about they were referred to as “the mother” or “the
father,” thus distinguishing them from institutional insiders. The use of nouns rather
than proper names also constructs parents as objects to be worked on, rather than
as individuals to be listened to.
In contrast, therapeutic judges were attuned to social conventions that signal
respect and inclusiveness. They greeted the mother or father by name, and used
social niceties to put them at ease, as in the following example: “Ms. H., How are
you? You’re looking well.” Conversely, to signal their distance from the institutional
insiders, they might greet them not by name, which indicates familiarity, but by
saying “Good afternoon, counsel.”
Ordinary routines, such as setting the next court date, were also handled differ-
ently. Child maltreatment proceedings require multiple appearances at specific
intervals as a family’s progress is monitored. Finding a mutual time is a perennial
challenge in overworked courtrooms. Often, five or more institutional actors,
including the judge, attorneys, and caseworkers, must sync their busy schedules.
Court proceedings usually ended with the judge calling out dates and the various
institutional actors checking their calendars and agreeing or not to the proposed
date. More therapeutically attuned judges included parents in this ritual, asking
about their work schedules and convenient dates and times. In contrast,
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nontherapeutic judges excluded parents and simply told them what date to return
to court, no questions asked. The not-so-subtle social message was that their time is
not valued, their preferences not worth respecting.
Ordinary irritations were also handled differently by therapeutic judges. An
illustrative example was the way such judges treated common courtroom irritants,
in particular a parent’s late arrival. Late parents were a constant source of annoy-
ance to judges because of the cascading effect on their daily calendar, which was
difficult to complete under the best of circumstances. While reasons for lateness
varied, sometimes it was caused by the vagaries of the security line at the building
entrance, which often snaked around the building, spilling outdoors. (There was no
line for courtroom personnel, who gained entry by flashing their identification
cards.) The line’s length was also unpredictable, and varied from day to day. None-
theless, some judges explicitly rejected a slow security line as a valid excuse, and
used a parent’s lateness as an opportunity to berate them.
In contrast, therapeutically attuned judges were more likely to overlook a
parent’s lateness, and welcome rather than chastise late-arriving parents. One judge
even turned a parent’s lateness into a therapeutic moment, when a father arrived
late to court because, as his attorney explained, he saw a man he had an altercation
with and was afraid to enter the courthouse. When the father arrived ten minutes
later, the judge interrupted the proceedings to welcome him. Leaning forward on
her desk with a slight smile, she said to him “Mr. (x) before you arrived, your attor-
ney explained . . . the circumstances of you not coming earlier. I think you used
pretty good judgment protecting yourself physically and emotionally. I’m proud of
you. It’s ok that you left and it’s ok that you came back. Your attorney will fill you
in on anything you missed, ok?”
Overall, therapeutic judges exercised “soft” power rather than “hard” power,
staying firmly but gently in control. They spoke in calmer, usually softer, tones
than nontherapeutic judges, who were more likely to use harsh tones. They also
used modulating words and phrases, such as “thank you” and “would you mind.” To
create a less formal and more welcoming environment, they alternated legal rituals
with social ones. For example, in traditional courtrooms the swearing-in ritual often
serves as the parent’s first introduction to the courtroom. Cognizant of its forebod-
ing nature, therapeutic judges followed it with a social salutation, and a more infor-
mal greeting.
Another distinguishing characteristic of judges with a therapeutic bent was
their physical bearing and nonverbal behaviors. Visibly, the black robes all judges
wear suggest a certain uniformity. However, any semblance of sameness is easily
overcome by other visible cues, including facial expressions, body movements, and
posture. Therapeutic judges used nonverbal communication behaviors that subtly
conveyed respect, patience, and attentiveness, such as nodding, raising eyebrows
and widening eyes, maintaining eye contact, leaning forward, and tilting their head
when listening.
In sum, therapeutic judges were acutely attuned to social dynamics and rituals
that communicate worthiness or unworthiness, inclusiveness or ostracism. While
traditional judges used routine courtroom rituals as instruments of social control, or
to send disapproving social messages, therapeutic judges transformed them into
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more supportive and affirming exchanges, from the words they used to their facial
expressions and tone of voice.
Bending the Adversarial System
The adversarial system is often unsuited to the purposes and goals of family
court. Especially after a charge of neglect or abuse has been adjudicated or admitted
to, and the focus shifts to “fixing” families, legal rules and procedures become bar-
riers, rather than facilitators. At this stage, court appearances are no longer about
adjudicating guilt but about a family’s functioning. There is less legal talk, and
more social and psychological talk, with the dialogue focusing on intimate family
matters. Is the mother attending drug treatment? How bad are the side effects from
various medications? Are the children doing well in school? When should a parent
be permitted to visit a child? Should overnight visits be allowed?
The adversarial system, though, invites, if not mandates, a parent’s silence,
with attorneys functioning as parents’ mouthpieces. Parents’ actions, motivations,
and social and psychological states are constructed through the words of others.
Agency records and reports detail their deeds, and their failures and successes.
Attorneys who spend little time with clients are expected to complete or contradict
the picture of their clients painted by others. In short, parents must prove their
worth, but without using their own voice, or their own words.
Therapeutic judges were more likely than traditional judges to acknowledge a
parent’s missing voice, and remedy it. They did not insist that all dialogue flow
through the institutional actors, and instead engaged parents directly, even overrid-
ing their attorneys’ protective and silencing gestures. They participated in both
informational and decisional dialogues with parents. For the former, they asked
parents to fill in facts, such as when they attended an appointment, or how they
were handling a medication’s side effects, or how many days they were clean from
drugs. This seemingly routine asking and recording of information leavened, if only
a little, the greater deference usually given to agency records and reports, while
making parents the authors of their own lives.
Similarly, therapeutically inclined judges were more likely to treat parents,
rather than the institutional actors, as an authority on family matters and decisions.
In an illustrative example involving a disputed visitation schedule, the judge
engaged the parent directly, soliciting both facts (when the father visited) and pref-
erences (which holidays each parent prefers). In another case, the judge had an
extended dialogue with the mother about choosing a residential treatment center
for a child. In a third example, the judge and mother discussed a child’s mental
health needs, with the mother voicing concerns about her son’s “anger issues”
directly to the judge, rather than through her attorney, who played a more periph-
eral role. The judge ordered counseling for the child, adding that the parent “of
course should be kept aware of his progress,” thus solidifying the primacy of the
parental role.
In sum, therapeutic judges struck a conversational and inclusive tone, engaging
parents directly. Although this is by design in therapeutic courts, it is less likely to
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occur in traditional family courts where the adversarial system dictates that most
dialogue flows through the attorneys. Therapeutic judges were willing to short cir-
cuit these institutional and legal norms and practices and interact more personally
with parents.
Offering Support and Praise
A common feature of therapeutic courts is the use of psychological insights
and methods to motivate behavioral changes. Instead of treating individuals as devi-
ant and condemning their behavior, therapeutic courts employ healthy doses of
respect, empathy, and forgiveness. This approach is bolstered by enhanced access to
treatment resources, individualized treatment plans, and a collaborative team of
community-based and institutional professionals. Traditional courts suffer from a
dearth of all of these, and the additional burden of high caseloads. Lacking both
time and resources, judges in a traditional courtroom seemingly have little incentive
to employ a therapeutic approach.
Despite these obstacles, some judges employed therapeutic techniques during
“big” moments, such as when a parent’s behavior and progress was being assessed.
Although surrounded by all the accoutrements of the adversarial system, they cre-
ated a supportive rather than antagonistic environment. Such moments are ripe for
stigma and shame, as intimate details of drug use and other negative parental
behaviors are publicly discussed by multiple institutional actors as a usually silent
parent sits in their midst. More often than not, the lone parent is a female poor
person of color, thus unspoken issues of race, class, and gender also tinge these pro-
ceedings. In the following vignette, the judge, in a brief seven-minute encounter,
transformed the courtroom into a therapeutic space rather than a stigmatizing one:
The judge began the proceedings by looking directly at the mother, with
a slight smile on her face, and saying “Ms. (x) how are you? You’re look-
ing well.” The mother responded that she was well, and the judge contin-
ued with a series of questions, directed to both the mother and the
mother’s attorney, about how the drug treatment program was working
out and how her son was doing. The mother noted she was 172 days
clean. In response the judge loudly applauded, smiling and gestured for
others in the room to also applaud, which all did. The judge then leaned
forward, and commended her for her sobriety: “I want to emphasize these
clean days. And I’d like you to do the same.” The judge then resumed
questioning as to methadone dosage and course of treatment. When the
mother noted that the dosage was being stepped down, the judge empha-
sized going at a comfortable pace “No celestial brownie points for doing
things faster than you are comfortable with.”
The judge then asked the mother how her son was doing, adding “will
you please bring a picture of [x] next time?” She also asked her preference
for the next date: “Are there some days that are easier for you than oth-
ers?” As the judge brought the proceeding to a close, she asked the
mother “if [the son] exhibits any behavioral problems let’s try and address
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them before they get worse, okay?” The mother agreed and thanked the
judge as she left.
From the judge’s initial greeting (How are you? You’re looking well) to her
request for a picture of the son, the mother was treated like an individual rather
than a case number. She responded in kind, animatedly providing details of her
treatment without any apparent shame. A potentially stigmatizing encounter was
transformed into an occasion of praise, which enveloped the whole courtroom. The
judge’s suggestion that the mother set her own pace (“No celestial brownie points
for doing things faster than you are comfortable with”) positioned her as autono-
mous and competent enough to make decisions about her treatment. The use of the
inclusive us (let’s try and address [any problems with the son]) suggested a commit-
ment to work together, equally, on any problems.
Overall, and in contrast to more traditional judges, who talked little or sternly
to parents, therapeutic judges injected morsels of support, respect, and empathy at
opportune times. As an example, during an admission of guilt, where parents are
asked a routine series of questions and told their rights, the judge was highly
attuned to the distraught mother’s emotional state. She told the mother, “[i]t’s not
a punishment, though it may feel to you like a punishment. It’s the court’s job to
help you and your family,” also later telling her, “I know this is difficult for you.” In
another example, the judge asked a mother if she was satisfied with court-ordered
services, a straightforward but rarely asked question in family court, where parents
are expected passively to accept and comply with whatever services are offered. It is
a respectful gesture that suggests the parent has the power to judge others, and not
solely to be judged by them.
This more therapeutic approach often extended to the institutional actors,
including attorneys, and especially caseworkers. In the hierarchy of institutional
actors, child welfare caseworkers occupy the lowest rung. They have less education
than the higher-status attorneys, who outnumber them in the courtroom. They
often come from the same disenfranchised group—women of color—as parents.
While they are much more likely than parents to participate, like parents, what
they have to say is often communicated through an attorney. Also like parents,
their behavior and competency is under a microscope. Agency missteps, such as
incomplete reports, missing documents, or inadequate monitoring of parents, are
often attributed to them.
While nontherapeutic judges were likely to admonish and criticize caseworkers
harshly, therapeutically inclined judges were more conciliatory and respectful. In a
contrasting example, a nontherapeutic judge, upset that the agency had not held a
crucial conference to “explore” what services the family needed, told the caseworker
in an impatient and irritated voice, “explore means you are doing nothing. . . . I
don’t make my rules based on your conferences. If I waited for [the agency] to do
conferences the cases will take years. I’ll give you a week and a half for the
conference.”
A therapeutic judge, confronted with a similar problem, first looked for the
reason: “I can see there was another caseworker, so I can see how that may explain
the insufficient efforts.” Speaking calmly and deliberatively, the judge said: “It’s
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been more than two months. Something should have been done. This needs to be
done before the permanency hearing.” In contrast to the example above, she did
not use the misstep to criticize the worker, while firmly but nicely directing the
caseworker to act.
Therapeutic judges also strove to bring institutional actors and parents
together, rather than reinforcing their adversarial nature of the relationship. In one
such example, after a caseworker updated the court on the family’s progress, the
attorney for the children interjected, “I just want to express . . . I’m very pleased
with [how the case has proceeded].” The judge built on this comment, telling every-
one: “You’ve all worked very diligently . . . attorneys, caseworkers.” She then asked
that the mother (waiting outside the courtroom with the children) be brought in,
“so we can acknowledge her efforts.”
In sum, judges who were more therapeutically inclined created a nonadversa-
rial, supportive, and respectful environment encompassing both the institutional
actors and parents. They did so quickly and efficiently, and without creating any
courtroom bottlenecks. Instead, they saved time because treating parents kindly
rather than harshly was less likely to trigger time-consuming and disruptive emo-
tional outbursts.
DISCUSSION
The ideal judge, as described by codes of judicial conduct, is unreadable,
detached, and impersonal (Landsman 1983). Facts, not feelings, guide decisions;
passion and personality have no place. The legitimacy of the adversarial system
rides on neutrality, which requires judges to be detached. Judges, though, are not
interchangeable. As the extensive literature on judicial styles attests, judges vary in
how they view the law and run their courtrooms (see, e.g., Conley and O’Barr
1990; Mack and Anleu 2010).
These differences are, in part, a function of the highly discretionary and auton-
omous nature of judging. More significant, though, than these differences, is the
context within which they occur. Child maltreatment cases involve individuals stig-
matized on the multiple levels of race, gender, and poverty. African American chil-
dren are overrepresented in the child welfare system, and poor people are more
likely than the affluent to be accused of child maltreatment (Courtney et al. 2005;
Boyd 2014). They are also more likely to be receiving welfare, a deeply seated
stigma. Finally, family court respondents are mostly women who have failed at
mothering, and hence are subject to “a special form of contempt reserved for moth-
ers, particularly those who are unmarried” (Reich 2005, 10).
It is thus not surprising that parents are more likely than not to be treated
harshly, paternalistically, and disrespectfully. As Goffman put it, stigma creates
unease and discomfort for all actors, making “for anxious unanchored interaction”
(Goffman 1963, 18). Judges are not immune from this discomfort, and can be cap-
tured by those same stereotypes, exercising their discretion in ways that reinforce
rather than challenge them (Lens forthcoming). Family courts are also bureauc-
racies and must process a high number of cases quickly and efficiently. Judges’
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encounters with parents are hence episodic and brief, and there is little time to
form judgments. A quicker and simpler device is to rely on negative stereotypes as
a shortcut (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003).
However, as this study’s findings demonstrate, some judges chose a different
path. Faced with institutional obstacles identical to those confronting their col-
leagues, including high caseloads, insufficient resources, and challenging cases, and
lacking the institutional support available in therapeutic courts, several of the
judges chose to employ a therapeutic approach.
From a theoretical perspective, the existence of such judges illustrates the vari-
ability within institutions that are often portrayed as monolithic and, in the case of
traditional family courts, as ineffective. Notably, these judges went against the grain
and did not yield to the negative stereotypes that dominate such courts. They were
able to turn “anxious unanchored interaction[s]” into more constructive dialogues.
A parallel phenomenon occurs in the welfare bureaucracy, an analogous govern-
ment institution serving similar (and sometimes the same) disenfranchised people.
Sprinkled among the prototypical bureaucrats who exercise their discretion nega-
tively are more kindly and compassionate workers. This occurs on all levels, from
the few front-line workers who choose to act as social workers rather than
“efficiency engineers” (Watkins-Hayes 2009, 61) to the administrative law judges
who hear welfare claims, some of whom act as reformers rather than enforcers
(Lens 2013).
The existence of against the grain institutional actors may be explained, in
part, by how workers construct their professional identities. All workers start with
the same “discretionary toolkits,” including the goods and services provided by the
organization and the rules and procedures for distributing them (Watkins-Hayes
2009, 56). Workers then customize their toolkits, adding in their own “stylistic
devices,” drawing from both “their cumulative understandings of clients and the
institution” and their own personal, political, and social beliefs (56). The latter fac-
tors especially may explain institutional actors who resist institutional and societal
norms. However, there is no straight line between the two. In this study, markers of
less conventional political and social beliefs, such as previous experience as a public
interest attorney, did not line up with current judicial style. Nor did markers such
as gender play a role, as there was wide variation of judicial styles among the sam-
ple, which with one exception was female. Further research is needed to understand
what factors foster against the grain institutional actors.
From a practical perspective, the study’s findings suggests that therapeutic juris-
prudence and other problem-solving techniques can be effectively deployed in even
the most overburdened and underresourced of traditional family courts. Such an
approach does not necessarily require a specialized court but, in essence, a special-
ized judge, one versed in therapeutic techniques and willing and able to use them,
as were the judges in this study. They engaged directly with parents, rather than
through their attorneys. They created collaborative and respectful environments.
And they relied on empathy and support, rather than sanctions and threats, to
motivate parents and institutional actors alike. In short, the judges’ singularly
powerful role allowed court processes to be modified to include therapeutic
techniques.
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The findings also suggest that family court judges should be selected based on
judicial temperament and style, and ability to implement therapeutic techniques.
This is equally true for specialized therapeutic courts and traditional ones. As the
study by Picard-Fritsche et al. (2011) described above showed, more significant
than whether the court was based on a therapeutic model was the respondents’ per-
ceptions of the presiding judge. Whether therapeutic judges are born or made, or
whether such skills can be taught, or are so innately personal that some judges will
invariably be more therapeutic than others, requires further research.
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